uniteTOlove.ca

The Community Safety Perception Gap

Crime stats are falling but fear isn't — why Torontonians feel less safe than the numbers say they should.

DRAFTThe evidence fileThe playbook

Claim coverage as of 2026-07-16: 0 formally registered claims (none exist for this slug) · content sourced from 1 carried-forward master briefing (this page’s carried-forward master briefing (community safety), carried forward as a merged variant per that page's own internal recordsthis page’s own scope note) + 8 NEW discovery-pass items, all independently and directly fetched or search-confirmed this review. Coverage pass, 2026-07-16 — a later verification pass restored four carried-forward master briefing items this backgrounder's prior draft had omitted (crime-rate vs. national-average figures, the 2024 gun-violence spike figures, the 60% TTC-perception figure, and carding/TAVIS over-policing history with its trust/equity implications), plus extended the existing "real victims and real fear" framing; see that page's coverage checklist for the full per-item disposition, including items correctly handed off to sibling pages rather than restored here.

a later review. that page's own internal recordsthis page’s own scope note shows coverage class "partial," with this page’s carried-forward master briefing (community safety) listed as a merge-group variant under community-safety-crime-policing (source: this page’s carried-forward master briefing (community safety)). Provenance note, same discipline as the sibling police-accountability-oversight leaf: the source document is an advocacy-toned "expert briefing," explicitly attributed to a named individual and consultancy, written to argue a specific policy position (a "public-health, prevention-and-intervention approach" over "tough-on-crime theatre") with attached policy recommendations. This backgrounder does not import that document's authorial voice, named authorship, recommendations, or argumentative framing — it extracts only the factual claims that trace to a real, checkable source (an official statistics agency, a named polling firm's published survey, a City of Toronto evaluation report), re-verifies the most load-bearing of them against primary or close-to-primary sources this review, and presents them in this project's own neutral voice.

Scope

This backgrounder covers: the documented gap between statistical crime/safety trends and Toronto-area public perception of safety, evidenced by directly-sourced 2025 polling data; the Toronto Community Crisis Service (TCCS) as a "right responder" model diverting mental-health-crisis calls from police response, evidenced by the City's own third-party evaluation data; and city safety rankings (the Economist/EIU Safe Cities Index) as one commonly-cited, if dated and imperfect, benchmark for the "actual safety" side of the perception gap.

This document does not cover: policing budgets, staffing, or enforcement outcomes (community-safety-crime-policing); complaint/discipline/oversight questions (police-accountability-oversight); or gun/gang violence-prevention grant programming specifically (gun-gang-youth-violence-prevention), though this document's homicide/shooting figures necessarily touch adjacent ground to that leaf and are cited here only for the perception-gap comparison, not as a violence-prevention program evaluation.

Current state

The perception gap, directly evidenced (December 2025 polling)

The most directly on-point, load-bearing source located in this review's discovery is a Liaison Strategies survey published December 30, 2025 and first reported by the Toronto Star, independently and directly fetched in full this review (https://press.liaisonstrategies.ca/perception-gap-gta-residents-believe-crime-is-rising-even-when-it-isnt). Liaison Strategies describes itself as ranking "#1 in accuracy in the 2025 Ontario election and #2 nationally in the 2025 federal election" and as a member of the Canadian Research Insights Council (CRIC) — cited here as the firm's own stated credentials, not independently audited by this document. The survey was conducted October 22–23, 2025 via Interactive Voice Response (IVR), polling 1,000 Toronto residents (margin of error ±3.09 percentage points, 19 times out of 20) alongside separate regional samples in Brampton, Mississauga, Vaughan, and Markham (800 each) [NEW-CG01].

Per the survey's own published findings: "76% of Torontonians believe crime in Canada as a whole has increased over the past year," and, on homicide specifically, "In Toronto, homicides have plummeted, yet 72% of residents believe they are on the rise" (quoting the survey's principal, David Valentin, directly) [NEW-CG02]. On auto theft: "While auto thefts dropped by over 25% in Toronto, nearly 40% in Peel, and 37% in York, more than 7 in 10 Torontonians and Bramptonians still believe the problem is worsening" [NEW-CG03]. The survey's own regional comparison data shows the same pattern replicated outside Toronto: in York Region, "homicides down 67% and hate crimes down 25% mid-year, yet over half of residents in Vaughan and Markham still perceive these crimes to be on the rise," and in Peel Region, Brampton (73%) and Mississauga (60%) residents perceived homicides as increasing despite Peel Regional Police reporting "only 10 occurrences through October 2025, compared to 19 for the full year of 2024" [NEW-CG04]. The survey's own summary framing states: "What we have found is that citizens in every major city feel crime is going up regardless of whether crime has increased, remained stable or declined" (quoting Valentin) [NEW-CG05].

The master briefing document this page inherits from separately reports an earlier, transit-specific perception figure — that 60% of residents think TTC safety has worsened — flagged in that source itself as [confirm] ⚠️ still being checked (carried-forward; not independently re-fetched or re-surveyed this review, and not necessarily the same survey wave or methodology as the Liaison Strategies poll above). It is reported here as a second, separately-sourced data point consistent with the same qualitative perception-gap pattern documented above, not as an independently confirmed figure. Taking both the statistical trend and this scale of public fear seriously is central to this page’s own subject: a real perception gap does not make the underlying fear illogical or the concern about transit safety specifically something to dismiss — the honest position is that both the direction of the crime data and the scale and legitimacy of public concern are real and need addressing together, not that one cancels the other out.

The underlying trend data the perception gap is measured against

Multiple, partially inconsistent figures for Toronto's actual 2025 homicide and auto-theft trends were located in this review's discovery, and this document reports the range honestly rather than picking one. On homicides: one search-surfaced source states Toronto recorded 42 homicides in 2025 ("the lowest rate since 1986"), while another states 39 homicides as of December 18, 2025, "a 55% decrease from the 81 homicides during the same period in 2024" [NEW-CG06, ⚠️ still being checked — both figures surfaced via search-result summary, not independently fetched from the Toronto Police Service's own primary data portal this review]. On auto theft: search-surfaced sources report year-over-year 2025 declines ranging from approximately 24% to 34%, depending on the specific source and measurement window [NEW-CG07, ⚠️ still being checked — same caveat]. This document does not resolve the exact figures; the qualitative pattern (a real, substantial, multiply-reported decline in both categories) is well-supported even though the precise percentage is not settled among the sources located this review. The Toronto Police Service's own Public Safety Data Portal (data.torontopolice.on.ca) was identified as the authoritative primary source for both metrics but was not independently fetched and queried this review — flagged in "Open questions" below.

The master briefing document this page inherits from (carried-forward) reports two further baseline figures relevant to the "actual safety" side of the gap, neither independently re-fetched this review: Toronto's overall crime rate as roughly 31% below the national average, and its violent-crime rate roughly 28% below the national average — both flagged [confirm] in that source itself, carried here with the same hedge, ⚠️ still being checked. The same source also documents a real, more recent reversal that the 2025 decline figures above should not be read as erasing: a 2024 spike in gun violence, with shootings up approximately 34% to 461 and 84 homicides — a five-year high — with youth increasingly involved and the average age of those involved reported as dropping from 25 to 20; the master briefing itself flags the specific claim that 58% of those involved were youth as [confirm], a hedge preserved here rather than resolved, ⚠️ still being checked. This is reported for the perception-gap comparison specifically — i.e., as part of the "actual safety" trend line the public perception is being measured against — and not as a violence-prevention program evaluation, which is the distinct territory of the sibling gun-gang-youth-violence-prevention backgrounder. Read together with the 2025 decline figures above, the honest picture is one of real volatility (a sharp 2024 increase followed by reported 2025 declines) rather than a single clean trend line in either direction — which is itself part of why a durable public perception of rising danger can coexist with genuinely improving recent-year statistics.

City safety rankings as a benchmark (dated figure, honestly flagged)

The master briefing document cites Toronto's 2024 ranking on the Economist Intelligence Unit's (EIU) Safe Cities Index as "6th... the safest large North American metro, though down from 2nd in 2021" with a link to the City of Toronto's own Progress Portal page. This review independently fetched that exact City of Toronto URL and found it displays outdated 2017 data (Toronto ranked 4th of 60 cities that year) rather than a 2024 or more recent figure [NEW-CG08] — the City's own webpage has not been updated to reflect the ranking the master briefing cited. A separate live-discovery search this review found a different, more recent claim: "In 2024, a ranking of 60 large cities by The Economist ranked Toronto as the 6th safest major city in the world, and the safest major city in North America," with "Calgary and Vancouver representing Canada in the 5th and 7th positions" [NEW-CG09, ⚠️ still being checked — surfaced via search-result summary, not independently fetched from the EIU's own report or a primary news source reporting on it directly, and notably conflicts internally with itself: Toronto is described as both "6th safest... and safest in North America" while Calgary is separately placed 5th, which would make Calgary safer by rank — this internal inconsistency is not resolved by any source located this review and is flagged as a data-quality concern with this specific figure, not silently smoothed over]. This document therefore treats the specific 2024 Toronto ranking as unconfirmed pending a direct fetch of the EIU's own report or index materials.

The "right responder" model: Toronto Community Crisis Service (TCCS)

The Toronto Community Crisis Service is a non-police, community-led crisis-response program for mental-health-crisis and wellness-check calls, launched in early 2022 as one of the priority actions under the City's SafeTO Community Safety and Well-Being plan. This review independently and directly fetched the City of Toronto's own January 16, 2023 news release reporting the pilot's first published third-party evaluation (https://www.toronto.ca/news/toronto-city-council-receives-toronto-community-crisis-service-mid-year-progress-report-confirming-positive-outcomes-community-impact/), covering the pilot's first six months (March 31–September 30, 2022), conducted by third-party evaluators the Provincial System Support Program and Shkaabe Makwa, both housed at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH) [NEW-CG10]. Per the City's own release, quoting the evaluation directly: "TCCS successfully diverted 78 per cent of 1,530 calls received from 911 with no police involvement." Of a total 2,489 calls received (from 911, 211, and directly to community anchor partners), 84% resulted in mobile teams being dispatched. Emergency-service backup was rarely needed: "TCCS made requests for police attendance during 2.5 per cent of calls attended and requested ambulance attendance during 1.7 per cent of calls attended." Crisis teams completed 485 post-crisis follow-ups within a 48-hour service standard, enrolled more than 25% of service users in post-crisis case management, and made 799 community-based referrals (231 to mental health/substance-use supports, 185 to housing supports, 91 to general healthcare) [NEW-CG10]. The City's 2023 operating budget included a stated 25% funding increase for TCCS "to support enhanced service delivery and strengthened dispatch processes" [NEW-CG10].

More recent, but not independently fetched this review: search-surfaced results indicate TCCS had grown substantially by 2025–2026, with a reported 2025 budget of $31.7 million and a proposed $35.3 million for 2026, over 200 staff, and continuing to report a 78% no-police-involvement diversion rate on 911-originated calls, with planned expansion onto Toronto Transit Commission subway platforms [NEW-CG11, ⚠️ still being checked — surfaced via search-result summary, not independently fetched from a primary City budget document or evaluation report this review]. The consistency of the 78% figure between the original 2023 six-month pilot evaluation and the more recent, unverified 2025-era figures is notable but not independently confirmed as the same metric measured the same way across that multi-year span.

Toronto: the case for and against

Section merged 2026-08-11 from a companion Toronto-specific brief (Lane L2a Toronto brief-merge pass).

FOR — the strongest case that this is a real, addressable data/communication problem:

AGAINST — the strongest case for caution before acting on any single figure:

Toronto-specific figures: No source in this page’s discovery provides a specific cost figure for conducting or commissioning safety-perception polling at the scale of the Liaison Strategies survey. TCCS's own reported budget figures ($31.7 million 2025, $35.3 million proposed 2026) are carried at “still being checked” status, not independently fetched from a primary City budget document this review. The original 2022 TCCS pilot evaluation's own specific cost was not located in any source this review.

Toronto-relevant precedents:

Municipal ask (upward): No formal Toronto City Council resolution specifically demanding a standing, current public safety-data dashboard, or a recurring independent TCCS re-evaluation at current scale, was identified in this page’s sources — a genuine gap, not a claim no such ask exists. Both of this page’s own recommendation cards (that page's recommendation cards) propose such asks as municipal-authority actions rather than upward asks to another government level, since this page’s sources show both actions falling within existing City authority.

Toronto bottom line: A real, independently confirmed gap exists between Toronto-area residents' perception of rising crime and multiple, if imprecisely reconciled, reports of substantial 2025 declines in homicide and auto theft — a pattern that replicates across neighbouring Peel and York Regions and is therefore unlikely to be a purely Toronto-specific artifact; at the same time, the City's own public safety-data communication (an EIU ranking citation page displaying nine-year-old data) and this page’s own inability to pin down a single authoritative current homicide or auto-theft figure across otherwise-credible sources suggest the "actual safety" side of this comparison deserves the same scrutiny and clarity the perception side has already received from independent polling.

Toronto-specific uncertainties:

Key tensions / tradeoffs

This section documents that a tension exists in the evidence on each side, not which side is correct.

A directly, independently confirmed perception gap sits alongside internally inconsistent "actual safety" figures. The Liaison Strategies survey data is the strongest, most directly sourced material in this backgrounder — a named, credentialed polling firm's own published, dated, methodologically documented survey. But the crime-trend figures it is measured against (Toronto's exact 2025 homicide count, exact auto-theft percentage decline, and current EIU Safe Cities Index rank) are themselves inconsistently reported across the sources this review located, with real numeric disagreement between sources on the homicide count (39 vs. 42) and auto-theft decline (24% vs. 34%), and an internally self-contradictory Safe Cities Index ranking claim. The qualitative finding — that a real, substantial safety improvement occurred in 2025 while public perception moved the opposite direction — is well-supported by the direction of multiple independent sources even where their exact figures disagree; this document treats the direction as well-supported and the precise figures as unsettled, rather than picking one source's number and presenting it as more authoritative than the others.

A "right responder" model with strong six-month pilot evaluation data, but a multi-year gap in this page’s own independent verification. The 78% diversion rate is a real, third-party-evaluated (CAMH-affiliated) figure — but it dates to a specific six-month window in 2022. This document did not independently verify whether the same rate has held consistently as the program scaled from a four-area pilot to its current, much larger 2025–2026 scope, or whether the evaluation methodology remained consistent — the persistence of the identical "78%" figure across multiple years in search results is treated here as worth flagging for independent verification, not as automatic confirmation that the metric has been re-measured and re-confirmed at each stage of the program's growth, rather than simply carried forward as a citation.

A "right responder" model exists partly because trust in the default responder (police) has been damaged, and that history bears directly on this page’s own subject. The master briefing document this page inherits from (carried-forward) documents that Toronto's own policing history includes aggressive, discriminatory practices — carding and the Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) — that "traumatized racialized communities and eroded the trust safety depends on." This is not independently re-verified or re-fetched this review (⚠️ still being checked), but it is restored here because it is directly relevant, not tangential: a documented history of over-policing in racialized communities is part of the causal backdrop for why a non-police "right responder" model has public and political support, and it names a real, two-sided equity pattern the master briefing itself draws out — the same communities most affected by violence are frequently also the communities most affected by discriminatory over-policing, so a credible response has to address both the harm of violence and the harm of over-policing rather than treating only one as real. This document does not have independently fetched, current-pass source material on carding/TAVIS's own record or any reform outcomes since — it is carried forward here as an inherited historical claim requiring independent verification, not as newly confirmed fact, and the general policing-reform and oversight territory this touches belongs to the sibling police-accountability-oversight backgrounder, which this document does not duplicate.

What the evidence does and doesn't support

Well-supported: the existence and core figures of the December 2025 Liaison Strategies perception-gap survey, independently and directly fetched and read in full [NEW-CG01]–[NEW-CG05]; the six-month 2022 TCCS pilot evaluation's core diversion-rate and program-scale figures, independently and directly fetched from the City of Toronto's own primary release [NEW-CG10]; the qualitative direction of Toronto's 2025 homicide and auto-theft trends (both down substantially, multiple independent sources agreeing on direction even where they disagree on exact magnitude).

Thin or contested: the exact 2025 Toronto homicide count (39 vs. 42, depending on source) and exact auto-theft percentage decline (roughly 24%–34% depending on source and measurement window) [NEW-CG06][NEW-CG07]; Toronto's current (2024 or later) EIU Safe Cities Index rank, which carries both a stale City of Toronto webpage citation and a search-surfaced figure that is internally inconsistent on its face [NEW-CG08][NEW-CG09]; and TCCS's current-era (2025–2026) budget, staffing, and diversion-rate figures, none of which were independently fetched from a primary source this review [NEW-CG11].

carried-forward, not independently re-verified this review (carried with the master briefing's own hedges): the crime ~31%/violent-crime ~28% below-national-average figures; the 2024 gun-violence spike (461 shootings, 84 homicides, the 58%-youth and age-25-to-20 figures); the 60% TTC-safety-worsened perception figure; and the carding/TAVIS over-policing history and its trust-erosion effect. All four were flagged [confirm] or otherwise unverified in the master briefing itself and are reported here with the same hedge (⚠️ still being checked), restored for completeness rather than newly confirmed.

International context

1. Treaties/frameworks touched. No binding international treaty or UN framework directly governs public perception-of-safety measurement or non-police crisis response design — this is a domestic public-safety/service-delivery area without a clear treaty anchor. No connection is manufactured here; none was found.

2. 2–3 best global comparators. (a) CAHOOTS (Crisis Assistance Helping Out On The Streets), Eugene, Oregon — widely cited internationally (including, per general awareness reflected in this repo's own baseline benchmark documents) as an originating model for the "right responder" concept TCCS itself belongs to; this document did not independently fetch a current CAHOOTS evaluation this review and names it only as a checkable, real, named program worth a future dedicated fetch, not as a verified comparator with confirmed current figures. (b) The Economist Intelligence Unit's Safe Cities Index itself functions as an international comparator mechanism, ranking 60 major world cities on a standardized methodology (76 safety-related indicators across health, digital, infrastructure, and personal-safety security, per the 2017 methodology description independently fetched this review) — useful precisely because it gives Toronto's "actual safety" claims an external, cross-city benchmark rather than relying only on local, potentially locally-biased reporting; its current (post-2017) data was not independently confirmed this review, a real limitation for its use as a comparator here.

3. What Toronto/Ontario can steal shamelessly. The most concrete, transferable and already-partially-adopted element is TCCS's own third-party evaluation design — engaging an external evaluator (CAMH-affiliated Provincial System Support Program and Shkaabe Makwa) from the pilot's outset, rather than relying solely on internal City reporting, which is a specific, nameable methodological choice distinct from (and stronger than) the self-reported metrics documented in the sibling gun-gang-youth-violence-prevention backgrounder's own program table. This document notes this descriptively as an internal Toronto practice worth extending (e.g., to the TCCS's own more recent, not-yet-independently-verified 2025–2026 figures, and to other City-run safety programs), not as an imported foreign model.

Cui Bono — who profits from this problem persisting

Per the Accountability Observatory's charter (Prime Rule): pointer, never author. this library's internal records was checked directly for this review — it contains no ESTABLISHED or REPORTED finding naming a specific entity that profits from the perception gap itself, from underreporting of safety improvements, or from TCCS-adjacent service delivery. This review's own live discovery likewise surfaced no such finding. One structural observation, stated descriptively rather than as an accusation and explicitly not elevated to this table: media coverage economics are commonly discussed in general public-opinion research (not a specific, sourced finding about any named Toronto outlet) as a plausible contributing structural factor in perception gaps generally; no ESTABLISHED or REPORTED finding names a specific Toronto-area media entity as profiting from this specific dynamic, so this observation is not populated as a table row and is not treated as a citable Cui Bono finding.

Table: empty. No entity_id/registered accountability claims is populated in this review. Per this library's standard page structure's own guardrail, this is not a defect — this is a perception/measurement and service-delivery topic without an identified concentrated financial beneficiary in any source located this review.

Indigenous context

an overlay check (2026-07-14), per this library's Indigenous-sources provenance standard, §6a. Sourced only from Indigenous-authored or co-produced material per the seed atlas (this library's Indigenous-sources seed atlas); a live Indigenous-authored discovery attempt was made this review, with the primary quote independently and directly fetched and confirmed.

This page’s earlier drafting flagged a pointer for this review to develop: TCCS's Indigenous-specific stream, delivered by 2-Spirited People of the 1st Nations (Indigenous-authored per the seed atlas), and a quoted characterization of it as advancing "self-determination." This review independently and directly fetched the source and confirms the quotation and its full context. Per the City of Toronto's own October 31, 2023 news release announcing TCCS's city-wide expansion — an co-produced document (City-authored, quoting an Indigenous organization's Executive Director directly) — 2-Spirited People of the 1st Nations was named as the "community anchor partner" for "Indigenous-specific city-wide service" going forward. Keith McCrady, Executive Director of 2-Spirited People of the 1st Nations, is quoted directly in that release: "Since the TCCS launch in 2022, 2-Spirit has responded to over 2,000 dispatches, supporting people in crisis and providing longer-term support to those who request it. We are proud to be a part of this work and are hopeful about city-wide expansion and what that will mean for our community. It is fundamental that Indigenous folks across Toronto have access to these types of supports. TCCS allows individual[s] experiencing crisis to have self-determination in their care." Source: City of Toronto, "City of Toronto Executive Committee adopts plan to expand Toronto Community Crisis Service citywide after successful first year," news release, October 31, 2023, https://www.toronto.ca/news/city-of-toronto-executive-committee-adopts-plan-to-expand-toronto-community-crisis-service-citywide-after-successful-first-year/, accessed 2026-07-14. Per this library's Indigenous-sources provenance standard's grey-area rule, McCrady's quoted words are treated as Indigenous-authored testimony within an co-produced (City-authored) document — this is 2-Spirited People of the 1st Nations' own characterization of what the program means for self-determination in crisis care specifically, not this project's own framing of it.

This is directly relevant to this page’s own subject: the "right responder" model this backgrounder documents as a structural response to the perception gap is, per this Indigenous-governed program's own Executive Director, also functioning as a self-determination mechanism specifically for Indigenous clients in crisis — a dimension the general TCCS evaluation data (95% satisfaction, 90% positive perception impact, cited in the City's own release above) does not itself disaggregate by Indigenous identity. This document does not have a source, located in this review, providing Indigenous-specific, disaggregated TCCS outcome data (satisfaction or perception-of-safety-impact rates specifically among Indigenous clients) — a stated gap, not an assumption that the aggregate figures apply equally.

⚠️ non-Indigenous-authored (about Indigenous people) (statistics only, not used for positions/needs, per this library's Indigenous-sources provenance standard): Statistics Canada's Juristat data on violent victimization and perceptions of safety among Indigenous women — directly and independently fetched this review — bears on this page’s core "perception gap" theme specifically, though at a national rather than Toronto-specific scale. Per StatCan's own release, drawing on the 2018 Survey of Safety in Public and Private Spaces and the 2019 General Social Survey on Canadians' Safety: "Indigenous women were more likely to perceive indicators of disorder in their neighbourhood, with about 7 in 10 Indigenous women (71%) reporting at least one small, moderate or big problem in their neighbourhood. In comparison, slightly fewer than 6 in 10 non-Indigenous women (57%) perceived social disorder in their neighbourhood," and "Indigenous women (17%) were more than twice as likely to report having not very much or no confidence in the police, compared with non-Indigenous women (8.2%)." Source: Statistics Canada, "Violent victimization and perceptions of safety among First Nations, Métis and Inuit women and among women living in remote areas of Canada," The Daily, 2022-04-26, https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/220426/dq220426b-eng.htm, accessed 2026-07-14. This is a Canada-wide, not Toronto-specific, dataset (⚠️ Still being checked: no Toronto-specific breakdown of these figures was located in this review), and describes a different axis of "perception gap" (elevated perceived disorder and lower police confidence among Indigenous women specifically, itself rooted in disproportionate victimization documented in the same release) than this page’s own primary subject (general-population perception of crime trends against falling crime statistics). This document does not conflate the two, and does not use this non-Indigenous-authored (about Indigenous people) data to state what Indigenous people want or believe — only what the survey measured.

Claim-index appendix note: [NEW-CG-IND1] TCCS Indigenous-specific program/McCrady quotation, [NEW-CG-IND2] StatCan Indigenous women's safety-perception data — both added this review, not yet through this library’s formal verification process.

Open questions / data gaps

Claim-index appendix

carried-forward (from this page’s carried-forward master briefing (community safety), that page's own internal recordsthis page’s own scope note; advocacy voice, recommendations, and authorship stripped — factual claims only, provenance named, largely superseded by this review's own more directly-sourced discovery below):

NEW (2026-07-14, inline source quote; no a formally registered claim minted this review):

About this file

Domain: A — Community Safety